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Yesterday, I was informed that the book Problems in Value Theory An Introduction to Contemporary Debates has finally been published. The book is now available both on amazon on Bloomsbury s website. Chapter 3 of this book Does Morality Depend on God? is co-authored by myself and Graham Oppy (Monash University). Both Graham and I each wrote an article (around 5000 words) spelling out our respective answers to the question, and then wrote a shorter piece (1500 words) where we responded to the others original essay. Problems in Value Theory is edited by Steve Cowan (Lincoln Memorial University). The table of contents is as follows:  Introduction, Steven B. Cowan  Part I: Problems in Ethics and Aesthetics Introduction to Part I, Steven B. Cowan  1. Is Morality Relative? Morality Is Relative, Michael Ruse Morality Is Objective, Francis J. Beckwith Responses: Beckwith s Response to Ruse Ruse s Response to Beckwith  2. What Makes Actions Right or Wrong? Consequences Make Actions Right, Alastair Norcross Respect for Persons Makes Actions Right, Mark Linville Responses: Linville s Response to Norcross Norcross s Response to Linville  3. Does Morality Depend on God? Morality Depends on God, Matthew Flannagan Morality Does Not Depend on God, Graham Oppy Responses: Oppy s Response to Flannagan Flannagan s Response to Oppy  4. Is Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder? Beauty is Relative, James Mock Beauty is Objective, Carol S. Gould Responses: Gould s Response to Mock Mock s Response to Gould  5. What Is the Meaning of Life? The Meaning of Life Is Found in God, Douglas Groothuis The Meaning of Life Can Be Found without God, Christine Vitrano Responses: Vitrano s Response to Groothuis Groothuis s Response to Vitrano  Essay Suggestions For Further Reading  Part II: Problems in Political Philosophy Introduction to Part II, Steven B. Cowan  6. Do We Need Government? We Do Not Need Government, Roderick T. Long We Need Some Government, Alex Tuckness Responses: Tuckness s Response to Long Long s Response to Tuckness  7. Should Wealth Be Redistributed? Wealth Should Be Redistributed, Jon Mandle Wealth Should Not Be Redistributed, Jan Narveson Responses: Narveson s Response to Mandle Mandle s Response to Narveson 8. When May the Government Wage War? The Government Should Never Wage War, Andrew Alexandra The Government May Sometimes Wage War, Nathan L. Cartagena Responses: Cartagena s Response to Alexandra Alexandra s Response to Cartagena  Essay Suggestions For Further Reading Index The blurb from Bloomberry is as follows:Problems in Value Theory takes a pro and con approach to central topics in aesthetics, ethics and political theory. Each chapter begins with a question: What Makes Actions Right or Wrong? Does Morality Depend on God? Do We Need Government? Contemporary philosophers with opposing viewpoints are then paired together to argue their position and raise problems with conflicting standpoints. Alongside an up-to-date introduction to a core philosophical stance, each contributor provides a critical response to their opponent and clear explanation of their view. Discussion questions are included at the end of each chapter to guide further discussion. With chapters ranging from why the government should never wage war to what is art and does morality depend on God, this introduction covers questions lying at the heart of debates about what does and does not have value.Get your copy now, read it, and let me know what you think both here and on Amazon. I am sure there is much more both Graham and I could say on this topic. Graham Oppy is one the best Philosophers of Religion in the world, and it was a real privilege being part of this project with him.   Tags: Divine Command Theory God and Morality Graham OppyComments Off on Problems in Value Theory An Introduction to Contemporary Debates: My Chapter with Graham Oppy is finally publishedLast week Jordan Hampton from Crash Course Apologetics interviewed me about chapters 12-13 of my book Did God Really Command Genocide. In this is the section of the book, I discuss divine command metaethics and critique some of the most important objections raised against divine command theories. The interview is nearly two and a half hours long. We go over every objection I respond to in the book. Enjoy Tags: Arbitrariness Objection Divine Command Theory Erik Wielenberg God and Morality Michael Tooley Russ Shafer Landau Sam Harris Wes MorristonComments Off on Divine Command Theory: answering classic and contemporary objectionsIn Part One, I expounded the Psychopath objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM) that has recently been defended by Erik Wielenberg. Wielenberg argues as follows:R1) If God commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.[1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) [2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R)[3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). [4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations. [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)In my last post, I contended this argument is crucially ambiguous; the word obligation occurs in both R1 and [3] and [4]. However, one can use the word obligation in an objective and a subjective sense. Objective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status that an action has in virtue of its actual circumstances and consequences By contrast, Subjective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status an action has in virtue of the agent s beliefs about its morally relevant circumstances and consequences (Smith (2010), 4)I contend that the distinction between objective and subjective obligation makes trouble for the Psychopath Objection. For the argument to be logically valid, and avoid committing the fallacy of equivocation, the word obligation must be used the same way in both premise [R] and premise [4]. When one examines Wielenberg s argument; however, we find this is not the case. If we interpret the word obligation in the subjective sense premise [4] is not justified by the evidence Wielenberg offers. By contrast, if we interpret obligation in the objective sense, then [R] is unjustified. The Subjectivist InterpretationLet us begin first by interpreting [R] and [4] in the subjective sense: (R1 Subjective) If God s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes a subjective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) [2*] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no subjective obligations. (from 1 and R) . [3*] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). [4S] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)If we interpret [4] in terms of [4S], then Wielenberg must contend not just that Psychopaths have objective obligations but also that they are subjectively obligated to refrain from immoral activity. He must hold that Psychopath s act contrary to their own non-culpable recognition of what morality requires. The data he cites, however, does not support this. Consider the following examples, which Wielenberg cites to support premise [1] The mainstream view of psychopaths in contemporary psychology and philosophy has it that they have significant neurological deficits that leave them with an absent or significantly diminished capacity for love, compassion, and guilt. They are often described as lacking conscience and are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands…(emphasis added) (Wielenberg (2018), 5) Since their dysfunctional conscience does not stimulate moral feelings, psychopaths do not become aware of the constraints required to understand that they have obligations. Their conscience does not make them responsive to the constraining power of morality ..(Emphasis added) (Ibid., 6)About one in twenty-five individuals are sociopathic, meaning, essentially, that they do not have a conscience  The intellectual difference between right and wrong does not bring on the emotional sirens and flashing blue lights, or the fear of God, that it does for the rest of us. … [Psychopaths] do not appear  to be aware of the need to justify actions which infringe moral rules [and] do not really understand the concept of morality … Psychopaths do not merely behave contrary to moral standards . . . but seem in some sense not even to understand the notion of a moral standard in any serious sense. (Emphasis added) (Ibid., 5-6)  Even more, telling is the conclusion Wielenberg draws from this data.Notice that the problem here is not that DCT implies that psychopaths are not responsible for their immoral actions. There are robust philosophical debates about the extent to which psychopaths are legally or morally responsible for their actions (see, e.g. Malatesti McMillan (2010) ). ….However, as far as I can tell, all parties to these debates would accept the claim about psychopaths upon which the argument of this article depends: psychopaths cannot grasp the authority and force of moral demands. As Erick Ramirez puts it,  psychopaths are said to suffer from moral blindness. Philosophers disagree on whether this moral blindness exempts them from responsibility for their bad behavior  (Ramirez (2013), 244). As this remark suggests, the moral blindness of psychopaths is widely taken for granted – and that moral blindness of psychopaths is the foundation of the central argument of this article. Accordingly, the problem for DCT that I have advanced here is not that it implies that psychopaths violate moral obligations but are not (legally or morally) responsible for doing so; rather, the problem is that DCT implies that psychopaths have no moral obligations to violate in the first place. (Wielenberg (2018), 8)This data, if accurate, undermines the claim that Psychopaths have subjective obligations. The evidence does not-unequivocally support the idea that they do what is wrong, given what they non-culpably believe about the situation. Wielenberg concedes Psychopaths are morally blind may lack a conscience do not understand the concept of morality and lack the constraints necessary constraints required to understand that they have obligations. His claim they have obligations carries no implications that they are culpable of their actions or culpably act contrary to what they discern to be obligatory. Consequently, [4S] is unjustified. [4] is only justified if Wielenberg is using obligation in the objective sense. Objectivist InterpretationThis leads us to consider next an objectivist interpretation of the argument.  (R1 Objective) If God s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an objective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.  [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) [2**] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no objective obligations. (from 1 and R) . [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no objective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). [4O] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4) If [4] is interpreted in terms of [4O], then [4] is plausible. Even if Pscyopath s suffer from a moral blindness which prevents them from recognising their objective obligations, it is implausible to think Psychopaths lack objective moral requirements. The problem is that now (R1 Objective) is no longer plausible. We saw above that Wielenberg argues for R by contending that standard responses to the promulgation objection rely on it. Wielenberg argued:A distinctive feature of DCT is that a given human being has moral obligations only if a divine command is somehow communicated to that human being. This aspect of the theory is emphasised by many proponents of the theory. For example, Adams writes: A command does not exist or have any force unless it is issued – that is, unless, it is in some way communicated (R. Adams (1999), 263). In defence of this position, Adams memorably remarks that [g]ames in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them (ibid., 261) (Wielenberg (2018), 2)He immediately continues:Stephen Evans similarly emphasises the importance of divine communication in this passage:A law that was passed in secret and never revealed to anyone would hardly be binding on the citizens of a state. It is true that it is often said that ignorance of the law is not a valid excuse for not obeying the law, but this principle surely assumes that the law in question is a matter of public record and that the individual who should obey the law could have known about it. Something similar must hold for moral laws as well. (Evans (2013), 37) In accordance with Adams s view that [i]n order to exist, a command .must be communicated to those who are subject to it (R. Adams (1999), 263), I shall henceforth use command to mean obligation-bestowing command. On this usage, no divine command is issued unless it imposes some moral obligation on those to whom it is issued (Ibid.)This argument does not, however, seem plausible if by R we mean (R1 objective). On the face of it, Adam s and Evan s are using the word obligation in the subjective sense in these paragraphs. Consider Adam s first, Adam s repudiates a picture of divine-human relations, one in which the wish of God s heart imposes binding obligations without even being communicated, much less issuing in a command. This is because Games in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them. In this passage, the phrase binding obligation is being used synonymously with incurring guilt . The problem he is addressing is that that one cannot incur guilt unless one non-culpably knows what is required. This best fits the concept of a subjective obligation. We can say similar things about Evan s. Evans states that a law passed in secret would not be is binding on citizens. However, he explains what he means next sentence; it is about whether someone has a valid excuse due to non-culpable ignorance. Evans is talking about an obligation of which one is not culpably ignorant and so incurs guilt for violating. So, Evan s is plausibly talking about a subjective obligation. ConclusionMy conclusion, therefore, is that Wielenberg s latest round in the dialectic on divine command meta-ethics is unsuccessful. His new Psychopathy objection commits the fallacy of equivocation. When he claims that God s commands, do not impose an obligation unless the commandee is capable of recognising the requirement as both authoritative and as having imperative force he uses the word objective either in a subjective or objective sense. If he has in mind the former, then the very data he cites does not support his claim that Psychopaths have moral obligations. If he uses the word in an objective sense, then divine command theorists are not committed to denying Psychopaths have moral obligations.Adams Robert Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Book].  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book].  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.Smith Holly The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs [Book Section] // Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics / book auth. Timmons Mark.  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010.  Vol. 1.Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies.  2018.  pp. 1-16. Tags: C Stephen Evans Erik Wielenberg Psychopathy Robert AdamsComments Off on The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (Part three)In my last post, I expounded the Psychopath objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM) that has recently been defended by Erik Wielenberg. To recap. Wielenberg suggests that my response to his earlier reasonable unbeliever’s objection” relies on the following principle:R) God commands person S to do act A only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.Wielenberg’ summarises his argument as follows:The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory[1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) [2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R) .[3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). [4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations. [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)I think this argument is unsound. However, before I can elaborate as to why I believe this, a couple of ambiguities in the argument need to be addressed.Let s look first at R.R) God commands a person S to do act A only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.As this is worded R lays condition, under which commands can exist. It entails that if someone does not recognise God s commandments as authoritative or having imperative force, then God has not issued a command. It is unclear, however, that the counterexamples I offered suggest something this strong.  Consider, in particular, the context of my replies. Morrison s had stated: “Even if he is aware of a “sign” that he somehow manages to interpret as a “command” not to steal, how can he [a reasonable non-believer] be subject to that command if he doesn’t know who issued it, or that it was issued by a competent authority?” (Morriston (2009), 5) The situation Morriston envisaged is one where someone is aware of the existence of the command but is unaware of its source.  What is being contested is not the existence of the command but whether unbelievers are “subject to it”. Morriston elaborates what he means by “subject to it” it later in the same paragraph. “[I[f the note is unsigned, the handwriting is unfamiliar, and you have no idea who the author might be, then it is as clear as day that you have no such obligation. He adds even if our reasonable non-believer gets as far as to interpret one of Adams s signs as conveying the message, Do not steal, he will be under no obligation to comply with this instruction unless and until he discovers the divine source of the message. Consequently, Morriston is not envisaging a situation where no one issues the command. He is instead suggesting that a command has been issued but that it fails to impose an obligation upon the hearer. It was in response to this argument that I offered my counterexamples. Consequently, these replies were not trying to provide situations under which a command exists. They were suggesting conditions under which an existing command can generate an obligation.Something similar is true of the other counterexamples consider Evan s example of the person hiking on the Iran/Iraq Border. Before offering this example, Evan s describes the argument he is responding to as follows;Wielenberg admits that if God exists he would be authorised to impose obligations on human beings… However, the problem is that for this to happen, the recipients of the command must know that the commands come from God, otherwise no obligation is generated.Evan s takes himself to be addressing the situation under which God s commands impose obligations. Not circumstances under which commands exist.Consequently, as R is worded, it is far too strong.   Wielenberg appears to be aware of this point. Early in the discussion, he states:Is shall henceforth use command to mean obligation-bestowing command. On this usage, no divine command is issued unless it imposes some moral obligation on those to whom it is issued. It is important to see that this usage may differ somewhat from the ordinary sense of command (Wielenberg (2018), 2)If this is correct, then R should be understood as follows:R1) If God commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.To avoid potential unclarity, I will use R1 instead of R throughout the rest of the discussion.This brings us to a second and more crucial ambiguity. R1 refers to an “obligation-bestowing” command. However,  the word “obligation” admits of different senses. Historically medieval theologians distinguished between a material and formal sense of obligation. More recent literature has used the words objective and subjective instead to describe this distinction.  Smith explains: “Objective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status that an action has in virtue of its actual circumstances and consequences” By contrast, “Subjective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status an action has in virtue of the agent’s beliefs about its morally relevant circumstances and consequences” (Smith (2010), 4)As an illustration, consider the case of David Cerven, an unarmed man who was shot dead by the New Zealand police in March of 2015. After committing several of armed robberies, Cerven had arranged with the police to meet at a public park where he would turn himself in. When the police arrived, he informed them he was armed and reached into his jacket pulling out what looked like a gun. CCTV footage showed Cerven “putting his right hand into his right-hand pocket, taking his hand out of the pocket and then appearing to clasp both hands together as if to make it look like he had a firearm in his hands”.  Cerven was shot and killed. Subsequent investigation revealed Cerven was unarmed.  (New Zealand Herald, 2018)In Smith’s terminology, the shooting of Cerven was objectively wrong. If we look at the actual circumstances and consequences, the police were shooting dead an unarmed man, who was not threatening either them or the public. To kill an unarmed man is morally wrong, and police officers have an obligation not to shoot unarmed people. At the same time, the shooting of Cerven was subjectively permissible. Given what the police knew; that Cerven had stated he was armed, was reaching for what looked like a gun, and the speed in which they had to make a decision, their decision to fire was permissible.Donagan (1977) points out that objective and subjective obligations play different roles in moral thinking. “When an agent and his moral counsellors are considering the moral permissibility of a proposed action, the first question to arise is, Is it materially (objectively) permissible?”. The agent is to attempt to discern his objective duties as accurately possible and to perform them.  By contrast, subjective obligations are utilised when a person has acted on what they believe to be their objective obligations, and we are raising questions about culpability and blameworthiness. If the agent act with non-culpable ignorance, even if the act is objectively wrong, he is excused and not subject to blame for performing it. Whereas he does wrong knowingly and intentionally, he is blameworthy. (Donagan (1977), 137)There are important connections between objective and subjective senses of the word obligations and significant discussion and debate about how to formulate them and their relationship to each other. These details do not concern us here.  What is pertinent is that the distinction between objective and subjective obligations provides us with two  possible interpretations of R :(R1. Subjective) If God s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes a subjective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.(R1. Objective) If God s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an objective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.The same ambiguity effects premise [4] as well. [4] could mean either:[4S] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. Or[4O] But there are no psychopaths who have no objective moral obligations.Having clarified some ambiguities in the Psychopathy argument. We can no turn to offering a response. I is my contention that the common distinction between objective and subjective obligation makes trouble for the Psychopath Objection.  In my next post, I will explain why this ambiguity makes Wielenberg’s objection unsound.Morriston Wes The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command meta-ethics [Journal] // International Journal of Philosophy of Religion. 2009 . Vol. 65Donagan Alan The Theory of Morality [Book].  Chicago : Chicago University Press, 1977.Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book].  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.New Zealand Herald Big Read: The life and death of David Cerven [Online] // nzherald.co.nz.  July 24, 2018.  8 10, 2019.  https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1 objectid=12094183.Smith Holly The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs [Book Section] // Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics / book auth. Timmons Mark.  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010.  Vol. 1.Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies.  2018.  pp. 1-16. Tags: C Stephen Evans Divine Command Theory Erik Wielenberg God and Morality Wes MorristonComments Off on The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (Part two)Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM). DCM has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible (Wielenberg (2008), 1). Wielenberg develops this argument in response to some criticisms of his earlier work. One of the critics he addresses is me. In some forthcoming posts, I will respond to Wielenberg s arguments. In this post, I will set the scene by explaining the argument and the context in which it occurs. Subsequent posts will offer criticism of the argument Wielenberg s New Argument from Psychopathy.Wielenberg calls his new argument the Psychopathy objection. The Psychopathy objection is the latest move in the contemporary debate between Wielenberg and his critics over the defensibility of divine command meta-ethics. By divine command theory, Wielenberg has in mind the divine command meta-ethics (DCM) defended by Robert Adams (1999) (1979), William Lane Craig (2009), William Alston (1990), Peter Forrest (1989) and C. Stephen Evans (2013). This version of DCM holds that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.In previous writings, Wielenberg has pioneered the promulgation objection to divine command meta-ethics. (see Wielenberg (2005), 60–65; Morriston (2009); Wielenberg (2014), 75–80). According to this objection, a divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers.In making this argument, Wielenberg takes for granted the existence of reasonable non-believers people whom —have been brought up in nontheistic religious communities, and quite naturally operate in terms of the assumptions of their own traditions. Similarly, many western philosophers, have explicitly considered what is to be said in favor of God s existence, but have not found it sufficiently persuasive. Wielenberg assumes many people in these groups are reasonable non-believers, at least in the sense that their lack of belief cannot be attributed to the violation of any epistemic duty on their part. (Wielenberg (2018), 77)Wielenberg argues that if the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God, then these people would have no moral obligations. Seeing reasonable non-believers clearly, do have moral obligations it follows that, DCM is false. Why do reasonable non-believers lack moral obligations, given DCM? Wielenberg cites the following exposition of the problem from Wes Morriston:Even if he is aware of a sign that he somehow manages to interpret as a command not to steal, how can he [a reasonable non-believer] be subject to that command if he does not know who issued it, or that it was issued by a competent authority? To appreciate the force of this question, imagine that you have received a note saying, Let me borrow your car. Leave it unlocked with the key in the ignition, and I will pick it up soon. If you know that the note is from your spouse, or that it is from a friend to whom you owe a favor, you may perhaps have an obligation to obey this instruction. But if the note is unsigned, the handwriting is unfamiliar, and you have no idea who the author might be, then it is as clear as day that you have no such obligation.In the same way, it seems that even if our reasonable non-believer gets as far as to interpret one of Adams signs as conveying the message, Do not steal , he will be under no obligation to comply with this instruction unless and until he discovers the divine source of the message. (Morriston (2009), 5-6)I have responded to Wielenberg both in my book and in a recent article. I argued that Morriston s argument contains a subtle equivocation. In the first line above, he expresses a disjunction. A person is not subject to a command if he does not know (a) who issued it, or (b) that it has an authoritative source. The example he cites, the case of an anonymous note to borrow one s car, is a case where neither of these disjuncts holds. The owner of the car knows neither who the author is, nor whether its author has authority. We can illustrate this mistake, by reflecting on examples where, a person does not know who the author of the command is, but does recognize that it has an authoritative source.Consider two counter-examples I offered, first:Suppose I am walking down what I take to be a public right of way to Orewa Beach, New Zealand. I come across a locked gate with a sign that says: private property, do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted. In such a situation, I recognize that the owner of the property has written the sign, though I have no idea who the owner is. Does it follow I am not subject to the command? That seems false. To be subject to the command, a person does not need to know who the author of the command is. All they need to know is that the command is authoritative over their conduct. (Flannagan (2017), 348)A second counter-example I provided was; Suppose, for example, that an owner of one of the beachfront properties in Orewa puts up a sign that states private property do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted and that John sees the sign and clearly understands what it says. He understands the sign as issuing an imperative to not enter the property. John recognizes this imperative is categorical and is telling him to not trespass; he also recognizes this imperative as having authority over his conduct, he also recognizes that he will be blameworthy if he does not comply with this imperative. However, because of a strange metaphysical theory, he does not believe any person issued this imperative and so it is not strictly speaking a command. He thinks it is just a brute fact that this imperative exists. Does this metaphysical idiosyncrasy mean that the command does not apply to him and that he has not heard or received the command the owner issued? That seems to be false. While John does not realize who the source of the command is, he knows enough to know that the imperative the command expresses applies authoritatively to him and that he is accountable to it. (Flannagan (2017), 351)In the first example, I am aware of the command but do not know who issued it. Despite my ignorance of the source of the command, I know it is authoritative over my conduct, and hence can be said to be subject to it. In the second example, John does not believe he is being commanded. However, he discerns the imperative expressed by the command and is aware both that it authoritatively applies to him and that he is accountable for performing it. A person who doesn’t believe in God can be subject to his commands if he discerns the imperative the command expresses and percieves its authority. Craig, (2018) Evan s (2013) and Adams (1999) have raised similar counter-examples. In a dialogue at the University of Purdue between with Wielenberg Craig responded by citing my second example and discussed is subsequently on his podcast. Evan s gives a similar counter-example. He imagines a person walking on the border between Iraq and Iran, who perceives a sign warning him to stay on the path. Because he is on the border, he does not know whether the Iranian or the Iraqi governments posted the command, yet he knows some government has issued it. (Evans (2013), 113-114) Adam s argues: We can suppose it is enough for God s commanding if God intends the addressee to recognize a requirement as extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. And that recognition can be present in non-theists as well as theists. (Adams (1999), 268) These examples all suggest that reasonable believers can be subject to God s commands without believing or knowing that God exists.In his most recent work, Wielenberg (2018) appears to concede the problem. He concludes that a reasonable unbeliever does not need to recognize moral obligations as God s commands to be subject to them. However, he suggests this response to the promulgation objection raises a deeper worry. Wielenberg suggests that, behind the responses of Evan s, Adam s, Craig and myself is a plausible principle which he labels R.(R) God commands person S to do act A only if S is capable of recognizing the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. R enables the divine command theorist to claim consistently that a reasonable non-believer has moral obligations. However, Wielenberg contends this comes at a cost; this is because when conjoined with DCM, R implies that Psychopath s lack of moral obligations. According to Wielenberg the mainstream view of psychopaths in contemporary psychology and philosophy which is that lack conscience and are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands . Wielenberg states, According to principle (R) above, since psychopaths cannot grasp morality s authority and force, God has not issued any commands to them, and so DCT implies that they have no moral obligations (Wielenberg (2018), 8) Wielenberg summarises his argument as follows:The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory[1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) [2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R) .[3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). [4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations. [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)In the next few posts, I will criticise this argument. In my next post, I will argue that the argument is crucially ambiguous in some of its key terms. In a subsequent post, I will argue that these ambiguities undermine the argument.Adams Robert Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again [Journal] // The Journal of Religious Ethics.  Spring 1979.  1 : Vol. 7.  pp. 6-79,.Adams Robert Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Book].  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.Alston William Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists [Book Section] // Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy / ed. Beaty Michael.  Notre Dame  : Notre Dame University Press, 1990.Craig William Lane Debate: God Morality: William Lane Craig vs Erik Wielenberg [Online] // Reasonablefaith.org.  February 23, 2018.  8 10, 2019.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6iVyVJAMiOY.Craig William Lane This most Gruesome of Guests [Book Section] // Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics / ed. King Robert K Garcia and Nathan L.  Lanthan: : Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2009.Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book].  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.Flannagan Matthew Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis [Journal] // Philosophia Christi.  2017.  2 : Vol. 17.  pp. 345-362.Forrest Peter An argument for the Divine Command Theory of Right Action [Journal] // Sophia.  1989.  1 : Vol. 28.  pp. 2–19.Morriston Wes The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command meta-ethics [Journal] // International Journal of Philosophy of Religion. 2009 . Vol. 65.Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies.  2018.  pp. 1-16.Wielenberg Erik Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless [Book].  New York : Oxford University Press, 2014.Wielenberg Erik  Virtue and Value in a Godless Universe [Book]. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2005  Tags: C Stephen Evans Divine Command Theory Erik Wielenberg God and Morality Psychopathy Robert Adams William Lane CraigComments Off on The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (part one) IS A FETUS A HUMAN BEING? Part one: Viability June 7th, 2019 by MattRespond This is one of a series of posts based on a class I teach for level 3 NCEA Religious Studies.In the last few posts we saw that most of the Christian religious tradition sketched the following argument against feticide;Premise [1] Killing a human being without justification violates the law of God.Premise [2] A formed conceptus (i.e. a fetus) is a human being.Premise [3] In the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) insufficient or no justification is forthcoming.In this next series of posts, we will look at [2], the claim that a fetus, is a human being.ViabilityA very common position put forward today is that a foetus doesn’t become a human being until the point of viability. Viability refers to the point in pre-natal development where a foetus can live outside the mother s womb. The idea is that fetus is not a human being until it is capable of surviving independently of another individual, before this period, it does not have an independent existence from its mother.Philosopher Susan Sherwin expresses this idea when she states that a fetus “is wholly dependent on her [the mother’s] unique contribution to its maintenance, while a newborn is physically separate, though still in need of a lot of care”[1]. Current medical technology means that viability occurs around 22-24 weeks after conception. At this point in time an infant that is born prematurely survive and be placed in an incubator. Objections to viabilityObviously, the claim that a fetus is not a human being until viability is controversial. Several important objections have been raised to this position. We will look at the main ones below.A. The problem of differing technologyThe Philosopher Peter Singer contends that just because a fetus cannot survive independently of its mother that does not mean it is not a human being. This is because whether a fetus is viable or not depends more on the medical technology of a particular culture than any feature of the fetus itself. A fetus that is not viable in a more impoverished country like Chad is viable in a city like Los Angeles. If viability is necessary for something to be a human, then a woman pregnant with a viable fetus in Los Angeles who flies from Los Angeles to Chad carries a human being when she leaves, but this human being ceases to exist when she arrives in India and yet becomes human again when she returns.2. The problem of conjoined twinsThe Philosopher Michael Tooley offers a different criticism of people who claim that viability is the point where a human comes into existence. Tooley argues this claim has the strange implications that conjoined (Siamese) twins are not humans either[2]. Consider conjoined twins Bob and Scott. If Bob is a human being, then since Scott cannot live independently of Bob, Scott must not be a human person. However, it is difficult to see what property Bob has that Scott lacks which would justify considering one a human and the other not. It appears then that one would be forced to conclude that they both are, and are not, human. However, both Bob and Scott are humans and killing one or both of them would be homicide despite this entailing that they are both human beings even though one cannot live independently of the other. C. Does Dependence end at BirthAbove we quoted the philosopher Susan Sherwin, Sherwin argued that the difference between a fetus and a newborn infant is that a fetus is dependent on the mothers care and cannot live independently of her. Some Philosophers have argued this is false, they claim that when you reflect on the facts carefully, it is clear that dependence doesn’t end at birth. Philosopher David Oderberg is an example:A born baby is also totally dependent on its mother, only instead of being fed and sheltered by the mother’s automatic internal processes, it is fed and sheltered by the mother’s consciously controlled external, behaviour. How can that make a difference to whether or not a foetus is a human being?[3]Peter Singer points out that a new-born is entirely dependent on its mother if it happens to be born in an isolated area where there are no other lactating women or the means of bottle-feeding. An elderly woman may be entirely dependent on her children looking after her. A hiker who breaks her leg a week s walk from a road will die if her companions do not bring help. Yet in these situations. Yet the hiker, the elderly women or the baby are still t human beings.  He concludes it is not plausible to suggest that the dependence of the non-viable fetus upon its mother makes it non-human.[1] Susan Sherwin, “Abortion a Feminist Perspective,” in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 5th ed., ed.Bonnie Steinbock John D. Arras (Mountain View CA: Mayfield Publishing Co, 1999), 364.[2] Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Autumn, 1972), 51[3] David Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Co, 2000), 5. Tags: Abortion David Oderberg Feticide Michael Tooley Peter Singer Susan Sherwin Viability1 Comment FETICIDE IN CHRISTIAN MORAL THOUGHT (Part Four) : Feticide in the Reformed Protestant Tradition May 28th, 2019 by MattRespond In our last post we saw how Medieval Christian s adopted the same position on abortion we saw developed in Alexandrian Judaism and by Patristic theologians. We also saw how this position found its way into European and English law.  Of course during the medieval period, Christian s in Europe were Catholic.  However, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Protestant Reformation happened.I. Martin LutherIn 1517 Martin Luther nailed 95 theses: propositions of protest, to the Wittenberg chapel door, sparking off a debate which would split Europe into religious factions. Luther began a movement known as Protestantism.  Protestants departed from several teachings that were advocated by the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages.  These teachings predominately dealt with issues of whether a person is saved by faith or works and questions of authority and church government. There were however also some differences in opinion on certain moral issues such as divorce and celibacy.What is interesting however is that on abortion, the leaders of the Protestant Reformation came to essentially the same answer as their Catholic predecessors.In his writings, Luther addressed the issue of feticide briefly stating, those who have no regard for pregnant women and do not spare the tender fruit are murderers and infanticides”[1].93  Luther claims that killing a fetus is both murder and infanticide.II. Philip Melanchthon (1497 –1560)A similar stance was taken by Philip Melanchthon. Melanchthon was a close companion of Luther and, next to Luther, was probably the most important leader in the Protestant Reformation and one of the first Protestant theologians. Melanchthon stated that on the forty-fifth day after conception a fetus with formed distinct members begins to live and he added, souls are inserted into children about the forty fifth-day and then not only should it [the conceptus] be called an embryo but even an infant .[2]   The reference to the forty-fifth day is probably a reference to the biological theories of ancient Greek philosophers which we looked when we studied  Alexandrian Judaism.III. John CalvinAfter Luther and Melanchthon, the next most important figure in the Reformation was John Calvin. Calvin established one of the most important schools of Protestant Theology in Geneva and wrote the most important defence of Protestant theology in the period.  In his Commentary on the Five Books of Moses. Calvin wrote that:[T]he fetus, though enclosed in the womb of its mother, is already a human being, (homo,) and it is almost a monstrous crime to rob it of the life which it has not yet begun to enjoy. If it seems more horrible to kill a man in his own house than in a field, because a man s house is his place of most secure refuge, it ought surely to be deemed more atrocious to destroy a fetus in the womb before it has come to light.[3]This comment occurs in Calvin’s discussion of Exodus 21:22-25. The is the passage we looked at when we studied Alexandrian Judaism.  Calvin appeals directly to the law regarding a pregnant woman, which was cited by Alexandrian Jews, such as Philo, and Patristic writers like Jerome, Augustine.  Calvin concludes that killing a fetus in the womb is homicide.  Like these other writers, Calvin takes abortion to violate the fifth of the ten commandments. The quote above occurs in a commentary on the ten commandments specifically in the section that explains the meaning of the commandment you shall not kill. IV. Early CalvinistsCalvin’s influence on later Protestants was immense. People who followed Calvin’s ideas were often called “Calvinists” or “reformed”. In England, a group of Calvin s followers emerged who historians call the Puritans they wanted to reform the Church of England along much more Calvinist lines and make its liturgy less  Catholic.A leader of this group was a man called William Gouge (1575–1653) Gouge was the chairperson of a committee which drew up a document called “The Westminster Confession in 1640. The Westminster Confession was an official statement of Protestant belief and is still the official belief statement of Presbyterian and Reformed Churches today. Gouge wrote that it was a violation of the fifth commandment to abort “that which hath received a soul formed in it by God” and that “if it be unjustly cast away, shall be revenged”.[4]Calvinists understood the sixth commandment to forbid killing a human being without justification. Calvin had argued that “The sum of this Commandment is, that we should not unjustly do violence to anyone .[5][Emphasis added]Calvin acknowledged that sometimes killing or violence are justified and in his commentary proceeded to justify homicide in certain situations based on the law itself. The conclusions that he reached were summarized in the Westminster Catechism under the question, “What is forbidden by the Sixth Commandment?” the answer was, “The sins forbidden in the Sixth Commandment are, all taking away the life of ourselves, or of others, except in case of public justice, lawful war, or necessary defence”[6] Seeing it makes no sense to punish a fetus for a crime or literally go to war with a fetus. These conclusions suggest that in the reformed tradition feticide can be justified, if at all, only under the justification of self-defence.[1] Ewald M Plass, What Luther Says: An Anthology, (St Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1959) 509, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1[2] Melanchthon, “Definitio Animae Usitata in Eccesia,” Corpus Reformatorum 13, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).[3] John Calvin, Harmony of the Law, Vol. 3 http://www.ccel.org/c/calvin/comment3/comm_vol05/htm/TOC.htm.[4] W Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, Eight Treatises 506, cited in G. Willams “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).[5] Plass, What Luther Says, 509, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion” Theological Studies, 31:1 (1970).[6] Larger Westminster Catechism, question 136 Tags: Abortion Feticide John Calvin Martin Luther Melanchthon Puritans William GougeComments Off on FETICIDE IN CHRISTIAN MORAL THOUGHT (Part Four) : Feticide in the Reformed Protestant TraditionRecent Comments Jeremy Mead: Never heard of a pre... Jason Thibodeau: If this is the case, then... David Booth: Wow. Thank you for sharing.... Matt: Jason wrote:[P3] says that... Matt: Jason You suggest that by calling... Jason Bruce Thibodeau: There are different... Matt: Jason, I am not sure I see the... Jason Thibodeau: On this Mackie is... machinephilosophy: Oppy, besides being a... Michael Martin: I wondered why there were... Matthew Flannagan on Amazon Did God Really Command Genocide? Coming to Terms with the Justice of GodAuthors: Paul Copan, Matthew FlannaganA common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.Buy the paperback versionBuy the Kindle versionTrue Reason: Confronting the Irrationality of the New AtheismEds: Tom Gilson, Carson WeitnauerToday's New Atheists proclaim themselves our culture's party of reason. It is a claim they cannot sustain. Reason is the New Atheists' weakness, not their strength and in fact, the Christian faith is a far better place to look for True Reason. Making their case accessible to the first-time inquirer as well as the serious student, this top-flight team of writers presents a sound defense and a strong introduction to the true reason uniquely found in Christianity.Feat. William Lane Craig, Sean McDowell, John DePoe, Chuck Edwards, Peter Grice, Matthew Flannagan, et al.Buy the paperback versionIn Defense of the Bible: A Comprehensive Apologetic for the Authority of ScriptureEds: Steven B Cowan and Terry L WilderThe book begins by examining foundational philosophical approaches to the Bible as well as the methodological challenges those philosophies create for interpreting the Bible. It then addresses textual and historical challenges and how to deal with them. Finally it looks at ethical, scientific, and theological challenges demonstrating the Bible's moral integrity in relationship to contemporary moral emphases.Feat. R Douglas Geivett, William A Dembski, Mary Jo Sharp, Darrell L Bock, Paul Copan, Matthew Flannagan, et al.Buy the paperback versionBuy the Kindle versionEd: Michael W AustinMany philosophers have considered the strengths and weaknesses of a virtue-centered approach to moral theory. Much less attention has been given to how such an approach bears on issues in applied ethics. The essays in this volume apply a virtue-centered perspective to a variety of contemporary moral issues.Feat. Michael W Austin, Robert K Garcia, Nathan L King, Gregory Bassham, Nancy E Snow, Matthew Flannagan, et al.Buy the hardcover versionHoly War in the Bible: Christian Morality and an Old Testament ProblemEds: Heath A Thomas, Jeremy Evans & Paul CopanThe challenge of a seemingly genocidal God who commands ruthless warfare has bewildered Bible readers for generations. A range of expert contributors engage in a multidisciplinary approach that considers this issue from a variety of perspectives: biblical, ethical, philosophical and theological.Feat. David Lamb, Paul Copan, Murray Rae, Heath Thomas, Stephen B Chapman, Douglas S Earl, Matthew Flannagan, et al.Buy the paperback versionCome Let Us Reason: New Essays in Christian ApologeticsEds: William Lane Craig Paul CopanThe nineteen essays here raise classical philosophical questions in fresh ways, address contemporary challenges for the church, and will deepen the thinking of the next generation of apologists. Packed with dynamic topical discussions and informed by the latest scholarship.Feat. J P Moreland, William Lane Craig, Gary R Habermas, Craig Keener, Paul Copan, Matthew Flannagan, et al.Buy the paperback versionBuy the Kindle versionTrue Reason: Christian Responses to the Challenge of AtheismEds: Tom Gilson, Carson Weitnauer

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