CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES-http://www.calattorneysfees.com

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

Time 2022-08-19 21:14:09

Web Name: CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

WebSite: http://www.calattorneysfees.com

ID:287012

Keywords:

CALIFORNIA,ATTORNEY,FEES

Description:

ABOUT

Mission StatementContributorsDisclaimerContact UsEmail

SEARCH THIS BLOG

August 2022

Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Copyright

2008-2009-2010-2011-2012-2013-2014-2015-2016-2017-2018 Marc Alexander & William M. Hensley

August 18, 2022

Family Law: Section 271 Sanctions Request Must Be Timely Made, But Section 2030 Request Reversed Where It Appeared Ex-Husband Could Bear Fees For Both Sides

Trial Transcript Records Are Key In This Area.

In Marriage of Jensen, Case No. H04948 (6th Dist. Aug. 17, 2022) (unpublished), we picked up on these takeaways: (1) Family Code section 271 sanctions need to be timely requested during family law proceedings; and (2) Family Code section 2030 “needs” based awards need to comply with a three-prong express finding statutory requirement. In this situation, the lower court did not properly indicate why ex-husband could not afford both parties’ fees—the third prong—so that the matter was reversed. It was unclear whether it was outright reversed or remanded.

Posted at 08:21 AM in Cases: Family Law | Permalink| Comments (0)

Lis Pendens: Challenge To A Lis Pendens Expungement Fee Award Must Be Made Through A Writ Proceeding, In Most Cases

A Good Reminder To Real Estate Practitioners.

Norton v. Haskins, Case No. D078431 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Aug. 17, 2022) (unpublished) is a good reminder to real estate litigators/practitioners that, in general, a challenge to a lis pendens expungement fee order must be done through a writ petition, not just a normal appeal. (See Shah v. McMahon, 148 Cal.App.4th 526, 529 (2007).)

Posted at 08:11 AM in Cases: Lis Pendens | Permalink| Comments (0)

August 17, 2022

SLAPP: SLAPP Fee Award Affirmed Because Hourly Rates Were Reasonable

Opposing Arguments Were Dismissed, Including That A Prior Disciplined Attorney’s Rates Should Be Compromised Where No Causal Connection Demonstrated.

SLAPP fees are mandatory to a prevailing defendant, such that a challenge to their reasonableness must have some bite. That bite was missing in Creative Care, Inc. v. McEntyre, Case No. B308643 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Aug. 17, 2022) (unpublished). The litigant suffered a $14,030 adverse SLAPP fee attorney’s fees order. That litigant challenged the $550 hourly rate by opposing counsel, but the appellate court affirmed after deciding that (1) some faulty legal arguments by counsel did not necessarily justify a reduction under the circumstances of the matter, and (2) the claimant’s attorney’s prior Bar discipline did not warrant a deduction because there was no causal connection between the discipline and the fee request which was made in this case.

Posted at 08:37 PM in Cases: SLAPP | Permalink| Comments (0)

Private Attorney General: $468,228.73 Fee Award To Sierra Club In CEQA Case Affirmed

.5 Multiplier Based On Contingency Factor Also Sustained.

In Sierra Club v. County of San Diego, Case No. D079518 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Aug. 17, 2022) (unpublished), the 4/1 DCA affirmed a $468,228.73 fees award to the Sierra Club under the private attorney general statute where a lower court vacated an EIR certification and approval for two developments, with a .5 positive multiplier being awarded. The appellate court, as we bloggers see from the news, validated that carbon-offset mitigation measures need to be considered. It also found this was not just a “tag along” to related proceedings and a positive multiplier was justified based on a contingency risk factor.

BLOG OBSERVATION—Although she was not involved in this case, we note that 4/1 DCA Justice Judith L. Haller will be retiring from this appellate division after 28 years of service. We wish her well.

Posted at 08:26 PM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5) | Permalink| Comments (0)

Sanctions: $960 Sanctions Order Issued For A Frivolous Motion For Reconsideration Is Affirmed On Appeal

Decision Also Has A Colorful Quote On A Confusing Appellant’s Brief.

If a motion for reconsideration is meritless, frivolous, or filed in bad faith, the trial court may order sanctions against the movant pursuant to section 128.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (d); Young v. Rosenthal (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 96, 123; In re Marriage of Green (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 14, 26.) A lower court in Banks v. Mastorakos, Case No. B309937 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Aug. 16, 2022) (unpublished) imposed $960 in sanctions against plaintiff for bringing a frivolous motion for reconsideration after an adverse summary grant, a result affirmed on appeal because the reconsideration motion did not mention any new facts and cited improper statutes/ordinances.

BLOG OBSERVATION: We also enjoyed Justice Ashmann-Gerst’s observation about the quality of appellant’s briefing on appeal, which should remind us all of how real care needs to be devoted to developing arguments on appeal or whether to appeal in the first place: “On appeal, Banks raises a confusing miasma of arguments. As another court observed of a similarly perplexing opening brief, ‘this document is strongly reminiscent of those magazine puzzles of yesteryear where the reader was challenged to “guess what is wrong with this picture.”’ (People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 280.)”

Posted at 08:07 PM in Cases: Sanctions | Permalink| Comments (0)

August 16, 2022

Section 1717: $70,882.50 Attorney’s Fees Award Based On A Construction Subcontract Is Affirmed On Appeal

Neither Legal Entitlement Nor Fee Amount Arguments Prevailed On Appeal.

Plaintiff subcontractor brought a third-party beneficiary action against general contractor which was resolved adversely on res judicata and statute of limitations grounds in a situation where there was a subcontract with a contractual fees clause encompassing “actual” attorney’s fees incurred. With a few subtractions from the claimed request, the lower court awarded prevailing general contractor $70,882.50 in contractual attorney’s fees.

That result was affirmed by the Fifth District in Ayala Boring, Inc. v. HPS Mechanical, Inc., Case No. F082276 (5th Dist. Aug. 16, 2022) (unpublished). Fee entitlement was present based on the complaint allegations referencing a subcontract with a fees clause, even though in a footnote the appellate panel indicated that it was unlikely that “actual” instead of “reasonable” fees could be awarded under Civil Code section 1717. As to the amount, the award was not shocking given the detailed substantiation of hourly rates and fee work by the fee claimant.

Posted at 09:55 PM in Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink| Comments (0)

SLAPP: Sixth District Reverses Denial Of Attorney’s Fees And Costs To SLAPPing Defendant Achieving Partial Success

The Record Did Not Support Trial Court’s Finding That Defendants Derived No Practical Benefit From Their Partially Successful SLAPP Motion.

California’s Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c)(1) entitles a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike to recover attorney’s fees and costs, but does not define the term “prevailing defendant” and is silent on entitlement where a SLAPPing defendant achieves only partial success – leaving to the trial court’s broad discretion determination as to whether a defendant prevailed and is entitled to fees. However, as a general rule, a SLAPPing defendant who achieves even partial success must generally be considered the prevailing party. An exception to this general rule exists where the results of a defendant’s SLAPPing success are so insignificant that they achieve no practical benefit. (See Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc., 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 340 (2006).)

Success without benefit is what the trial court determined defendants had achieved in Maleti v. Wickers, Case No. H048393 (6th Dist., August 15, 2022) (published) because they were not successful in achieving their ultimate goal of dismissing the entire complaint. This resulted in the trial court’s denial of defendants’ attorney’s fees motion. However, the Sixth District disagreed and reversed – finding defendants’ success in striking one of the two causes of action alleged against them to be no pyrrhic victory. Unlike the situation in Moran v. Endres, 135 Cal.App.4th 952 (2006) – the case relied on by plaintiff – defendants’ partial SLAPPing success did not accomplish nothing. Rather, it had the practical benefits of eliminating the possibility of facing liability under the stricken cause of action, and of narrowing the litigation, discovery, motion practice, and trial prep.

Posted at 07:39 AM in Cases: SLAPP | Permalink| Comments (0)

August 15, 2022

Costs: Fifth District, In A 2-1 Split Decision, Confirms That Judicial Council Trial Court Costs Memorandum Form Sufficed For A Verification Despite Not Having “Under Penalty of Perjury” Language

Panel Also Concluded That Aggregate Costs Descriptions And Failure To Apportion Out For Nonprevailing Parties Are Solid Bases To Tax Costs.

In Srabian v. Triangle Truck Center, Case No. F080066 (5th Dist. Aug. 12, 2022) (unpublished), the Fifth District faced an interesting legal question where a prevailing party used the MC-010 Judicial Council form for claiming costs, which does not have “under penalty of perjury” language. So, the question was whether this was a compliant verification. The majority concluded that it was under CCP § 2015.5, while a dissenting justice found it was not properly sworn to as to comply with CRC 3.1700(a)(1) dictates. What this might countenance is that practitioners include penalty of perjury language in a costs memorandum (adding it to the MC-010 form), with the Judicial Council maybe contemplating an action to include this added language—given that this issue likely may be raised in future cases.

With respect to other issues, the appellate court did agree with some “tax costs” decisions by the lower court, the most important ones teaching us this: (1) each defendant must be considered separately as far as determining the propriety of claimed costs; (2) an aggregate dollar amount without any costs itemization may not be facially proper, especially with respect to specifying costs for each deponent; (3) there is no need for a trial judge to shift through invoices to determine what is proper; and (4) where apportionment is raised as an objection, the burden may indeed shift to the costs claimant for purposes of showing which claimed costs are appropriate.

Posted at 04:43 PM in Cases: Costs | Permalink| Comments (0)

August 13, 2022

Appealability, Special Fee Shifting Statute: Despite No Real Opposition To Civil Harassment Restraining Order Fee Motion, Reversal Of Damages Award Means Fee Award Had To Be Revisited

Appellate Court Agreed That No Opposition To Fees Would Normally Be Dispositive, But Reversal In Eliminating Damages Changed The Landscape.

Hao v. Wang, Case o. B306737 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Aug. 12, 2022) (unpublished) is an interesting case in showing how even a litigant not opposing a fees motion may still get a remand where there is a significant merits reversal. However, there was a threshold appealability issue which we also discuss.

What happened here is that a tenant obtained issuance of a civil harassment restraining order, including an award of special damages and damages for pain and suffering against landlord. More pain was imposed with an attorney-fee shifting award under the harassment statute because there was no opposition by landlord. The fee award was reversed because damages were not recoverable under the harassment scheme.

The appealability issue was resolved against landlord because tenant’s appeal of an order awarding fees but not fixing the amount means that the first order encompasses the subsequent order fixing the amount. (Golightly v. Molina, 229 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1520-1521 (2014).) [BLOG NOTE—We do not opine often on the correctness of the award, but a subsequent order fixing fees should also be appealed as we have blogged on many times under our category “APPEALABILITY,” just to avoid on a jurisdictional appellate challenge.]

Despite landlord not contesting the fee motion, the forfeiture was not dispositive because the damages elimination reversal required a “revisit” of the fee award, given this was a legal issue which could be considered de novo.

Posted at 08:16 AM in Cases: Appealability, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink| Comments (0)

August 12, 2022

Deadlines, Section 998: Plaintiff’s Acceptance Of A 998 Offer With Stipulated Fee Cap Took The Steam Out Of Later Attorney’s Fees Motion

Beyond That, The Motion Was Not Filed On 16-Court Days’ Required Notice.

This case shows how a litigant and his attorney’s prior actions can have a dramatic impact on a later attempt to obtain more attorney’s fees through a noticed fee motion.

In Baiocchi v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. G059143 (4th Dist., Div. 3 August 11, 2022) (unpublished) plaintiff accepted Ford’s CCP § 998 pretrial settlement offer for $27,000 for a car buyback, plus $10,000 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs (even though plaintiff had the option of moving for a different fee award by a motion addressed to the court, an option he did not elect although claiming otherwise later on). Plaintiff accepted, negotiating a check which had the $10,000 capped fees in the amount of the check. Then, after continued status conferences where plaintiff’s attorney sent a special appearance attorney despite the court wanting retained counsel to be present, and despite indications from the lower court and Ford that it wanted to see a noticed fee motion soon, plaintiff filed a Song-Beverly Act statutory motion for attorney’s fees of $179,481 (inclusive of a 1.5 multiplier) on less than the 16-court days’ required notice. The lower court denied the motion based on lack of proper notice and on the ground that plaintiff had accepted the $10,000 fee feature of the statutory offer.

The 4/3 DCA, in an opinion authored by Justice Goethals, affirmed. The two bases relied on by the lower court resonated with the appellate court—especially given that plaintiff accepted the $10,000 attorney fee offer by negotiating the check.

Posted at 08:13 AM in Cases: Deadlines, Cases: Section 998 | Permalink| Comments (0)

Fee Clause Interpretation, Mediation: Fee Clause Allowing Only Prevailing Party Attorney’s Fees For Mediation Or Arbitration Proceedings Enforced As Written

Fees Clause Did Not Allow For Recovery Of Fees In Litigation.

In Glass v. Whills, LLC, Case Nos. B304806 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 4 Aug. 10, 2022) (unpublished), both the trial and appellate court were dealing with a civil litigant’s claim for prevailing party attorney’s fees recovery under a fees clause providing that any disputes must be submitted first to mediation and, if unresolved, to binding arbitration, and that “[t]he non-prevailing party in any such mediation or arbitration, as determined by the mediator or arbitrator, shall pay the prevailing party’s court cost and attorneys’ fees.” The lower court denied the litigant’s motion for fees, finding that the mediations in which the parties participated failed to result in a prevailing party resolution or determination, and the parties did not thereafter pursue arbitration.

The appellate court affirmed that conclusion. It found that the clause was unambiguous; the binding mediator had the ability to determine the prevailing party such that the absence of language indicating a court could award prevailing party fees sealed the deal.

Posted at 08:04 AM in Cases: Fee Clause Interpretation, Cases: Mediation | Permalink| Comments (0)

August 04, 2022

Arbitration, Retention Agreements: Second Dist. Div. 8 Holds Work Improperly Done By Attorney Not Licensed In California Does Not Completely Invalidate Arbitration Or Retention Agreement

Just Because Some Work Was Done By An Attorney Not Licensed In California Doesn't Necessarily Mean The Arbitration Agreement Or The Fee Agreement Is Unenforceable.

Plaintiff Mark Brawerman sued Loeb & Loeb, arguing the law firm failed to protect his interests in negotiating with the venture capital firm Wasserstein & Co., resulting in the eventual loss of control of his successful business TMI marketing healthy frozen food desserts. As a result of the arbitration agreement in his retention agreement with Loeb & Loeb, the parties arbitrated. Brawerman was unhappy with the result. Learning that a substantial amount of Loeb & Loeb's services (382 of 928 hours) had been performed by an attorney unlicensed to practice law in California (but licensed in other states), Brawerman argued his agreement with Loeb & Loeb was against public policy, the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of his powers by proceeding under an invalid arbitration agreement, and the arbitration award should therefore be vacated rather than confirmed. The arbitration award was confirmed, and Brawerman's appeal followed. Mark Brawerman et al. v. Loeb & Loeb LLP et al, B305802 (2/8 8/3/22) (Harutunian, Grimes, Wiley).

The Court of Appeal affirmed, based on its analysis of two key cases: Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc., 6 Cal.5th 59 (2018) and Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.4th 119 (1998).

Sheppard held that the retention of the law firm, which happened to result in a severe conflict of interest, could be invalid as against public policy, resulting in a loss of attorney fees. In Brawerman, the court limited Sheppard by explaining Sheppard applied to a situation where a breach of professional ethics infected the entire agreement from its inception. Birbrower, like Brawerman, involved a situation in which an attorney unlicensed in California performed work for a California client. While the California Supreme Court held that the Birbrower firm could not collect under the contract for work illegally performed in California by New York attorneys, it did not void the entire retention agreement, because it was possible that some of the work had been properly done by New York attorneys in New York, and that work might be severable from the work illegally performed.

Unlike in Sheppard, in Brawerman there was no conflict of interest, nor was there a basis for finding that the retention agreement was improper from the beginning. In fact, but for the fact that an attorney unlicensed in California had performed some of the work in Brawerman, there would have been no basis for attacking the fees. Loeb & Loeb has plenty of California attorneys who could have been enlisted to do work for a California client under the retention agreement. Similar to Birbrower, the work improperly done by the attorney unlicensed in California, which involved filing an arbitration demand, might be separated from the work done by licensed California attorneys. The agreement in Brawerman need not be entirely invalid if work that was done properly can be severed from work that was done improperly.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the confirmation of the arbitration award in Brawerman.

COMMENT: Interestingly, the award in Brawerman resulted in disgorgement of fees to plaintiffs in the amount $138,075 for work done by the unlicensed attorney, and fees incurred in the arbitration of $94,833. So the retention agreement and arbitration agreement were legal, but the work done by the attorney unlicensed in California was not compensable. But this was surely small potatoes for Brawerman, who believed his attorneys had not protected him properly, resulting in loss of control over a multi-million dollar company, and who therefore wanted to undo the arbitration award in its entirety.

Out-of-state attorneys are, of course, happy to know that California fixed the problem after Birbrower regarding out-of-state participation in arbitrations. California now has what is essentially a "pro hac vice" approach to out-of-state attorneys wishing to participate in California arbitrations. Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1282.4.

This post appeared earlier on co-contributor Marc's California Mediation and Arbitration website.

Posted at 03:51 PM | Permalink| Comments (0)

Private Attorney General: Homeowners Prevailing In Malibu District Assessment Validation Battle Properly Denied Over $2.4 Million In Requested Attorney’s Fees

Whitley Financial Analysis Adopted By Lower Court Sustained On Appeal.

In Broad Beach Geologic Hazard Abatement Dist. v. 31506 Victoria Point LLC, Case Nos. 304699 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 4 filed Aug. 2, 2022; posted Aug. 3, 2022) (published), a group of Malibu homeowners successfully prevailed in an assessment validation proceeding against District under Proposition 218, a determination affirmed on appeal. Certain homeowners then moved for attorney’s fees under California’s private attorney general statute, CCP § 1021.5, for fees totaling over $2.4 million. The lower court denied those requests, triggering an appeal by certain homeowners. The fee denial, too, was affirmed on appeal.

The principal reason for affirmance was that the homeowners’ economic benefit in the litigation exceeds their litigation costs under the cost/benefit analysis of Conservatorship of Whitley, 50 Cal.4th 1206 (2010) [our Leading Case #14]. The lower court used a formula in arriving at this determination, taking the 10-year benefit to the separate group of homeowners, discounting by 50%, and then comparing that discounted benefit number to the homeowners’ litigation costs. The appellate court saw nothing wrong with this math, as well as rejected the argument that the possibility of a future assessment was enough to justify fee awards.

BLOG HAT TIP—Matthew Kanin, who has co-counseled several appeals with co-contributor Mike Hensley, won on the merits but lost the fee battle on appeal. Hat tip just the same.

Posted at 08:09 AM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5) | Permalink| Comments (0)

Bankruptcy, Costs, Ethics: Ninth Circuit Reiterates That Costs Associated With Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings Are Nondischargeable In A Chapter 7 Case

$61,122.27 Was The Tab.

In Kassas v. State Bar of California, No. 21-55900 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2022) (published), the Ninth Circuit reiterated that, in line with In re Findley, 593 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2010), the costs associated with a Chapter 7 debtor attorney’s disciplinary proceedings were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7).

Posted at 08:03 AM in Cases: Bankruptcy, Cases: Costs, Cases: Ethics | Permalink| Comments (0)

July 29, 2022

Section 1717: Interim Award Of Contractual Fees Under Civil Code Section 1717 Are Not Allowable Unless All The Claims In An Action Are Resolved

Premature Award Of $1.1 Million In Fees By Group Of Plaintiffs Reversed.

A group of tenant plaintiffs in Chen v. Valstock Ventures, LLC, Case No. A161885 (1st Dist., Div. 4 July 29, 2022) (published) won about $1.1 million in an interim fee award against a defendant after winning a summary adjudication motion on their declaratory relief contract claim. However, tenants had remaining non-contract claims to be resolved. The 1/4 DCA reversed. After an examination of the language and policies underlying Civil Code section 1717, the Rules of Court, and other statutes, it determined that interim section 1717 fee awards are impermissible, especially given that a summary adjudication order is not appealable and that section 1717 envisions a final judgment, dismissal, or other final disposition before fee requests can be pursued.

Posted at 05:49 PM in Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink| Comments (0)

Deeds Of Trust, Fee Clause Interpretation: Borrower Losing Wrongful Foreclosure Action Was Properly Assessed With Contractual Attorney’s Fees Under the Note To The Tune Of $878,067.11

“Security First”/Antideficiency Arguments Did Not Prevail Because Contractual Fee Exposure For Wrongful Foreclosure Claims Were Independent Contractual Obligations.

This next appeal is a somewhat related appeal to our independent July 26, 2022 post regarding sanctions awarded against plaintiff borrower’s attorney for violation of trial preparation rules. In Shiheiber v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. A160189 (1st Dist., Div. 2 July 28, 2022) (unpublished), plaintiff lost wrongful foreclosure claims against lender (the merits ruling affirmed in an earlier appeal), with the trial judge assessing $878,067.11 in contractual fees against borrower and in favor of lender based on a promissory note fee clause.

That fee award was affirmed on appeal, with borrower not challenging the amount of the award, but only challenging fee entitlement. Because the wrongful foreclosure loss triggered contractual fee exposure under separate loan documents, the fee award was legally warranted. (See Passanisi v. Merit-McBride Realtors, Inc., 190 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1507-1509 (1987); Flynn v. Page, 218 Cal.App.3d 342, 349 (1990); Jones v. Union Bank of California, 127 Cal.App.4th 542, 551 (2005).) These cases establish “that a foreclosure sale does not extinguish or preclude enforcement of a prevailing party attorney fee clause in the loan instruments. Such a provision represents a separate contractual covenant, distinct from the covenant to repay the loan on specified terms, that is simply intended to alter the traditional American rule that each side bear their own attorney fees in the event of litigation between them.” (Slip Opn., p. 9.) The promissory note clause was broad enough to encompass tort wrongful foreclosure claims. (Yoon v. Cam IX Trust, 60 Cal.App.5th 388, 391, 393 (2021).) So, the fee award was upheld.

Posted at 08:19 AM in Cases: Deeds of Trust, Cases: Fee Clause Interpretation | Permalink| Comments (0)

Section 1717: If You Claim A Redlined Draft Agreement Is The Contract And You Lose, Fee Exposure Can Occur

4/1 DCA Affirms Fee Award Where Pleadings Made It Clear That Redlined Draft Agreement Was The Operative Contract By Losing Plaintiff.

Plaintiff lost a demurrer without leave founded upon contractual breach, duty to negotiate in good faith, and promissory estoppel claims, a determination affirmed on appeal because the letter of intent made it clear there was no agreement until a formal contract was agreed to and signed and because there was a draft redlined agreement with multiple changes which was never accepted. The lower court then awarded $104,545 in attorney’s fees, the full request, based on a contractual fees clause in the redlined draft and under Civil Code section 1717.

The fee award was upheld by the 4/1 DCA in Evans v. Bosa Development California II, Inc., Case Nos. D078272/D078818 (4th Dist., Div. 1 July 27, 2022) (unpublished). The LOI showed there was no duty to negotiate in good faith, although the redlined draft agreement showed that this did take place. Defendant beat the contractual breach and derivative promissory estoppel claims such that it proved the nonexistence of the contract, entitling the defense to fees under section 1717. (Hom v. Petrou, 67 Cal.App.5th 459, 465 (2021).

Posted at 08:11 AM in Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink| Comments (0)

July 27, 2022

Private Attorney General: Where Plaintiff Did Vindicate Users Of Dangerous Condition Area But Obtained A $1.326 Million Damage Award, Cost/Benefit Analysis Supported Denial Of CCP § 1021.5 Fee Recovery

Case Was Not Unusual For Allowing A Fee Award Under Cases Which Did Allow Under Rare Circumstances Where A Benefit Exceeded Litigation Costs.

In Williams v. County of Sonoma, Case No. A162966 (1st Dist., Div. 5 July 27, 2022) (unpublished), plaintiff won $1.326 million in a jury verdict against County for a public property dangerous condition where, on a bicycle, she struck a pothole. In a prior appeal, County argued that she assumed the risk, but the appellate court rejected that argument based on the particular facts of the case—a narrow decision, although published. Plaintiff then filed to recover lodestar attorney’s fees of $112,710 against County under CCP § 1021.5. The lower court denied them based on the reasoning that her costs/benefits in the litigation, given the substantial jury verdict (even if discounted by 50% as far as hindsight expectancy which did occur), did not fall within unusual cases warranting such an award.

The 1/5 DCA affirmed. The appellate court did a nice review of “unusual cases” warranting a 1021.5 award where litigant’s expected benefits exceeded its actual costs. The problem is that plaintiff did not fall within these categories because the published decision was quite narrow, plaintiff was not seriously impecunious, and her judgment was of the type that could fund an attorney to litigate the matter. [If you want to know the “unusual cases” distinguished, they are Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 (1986); City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System, 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 703, 708 (2018); and Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1418 (1991).]

Posted at 09:51 PM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5) | Permalink| Comments (0)

July 26, 2022

Appeal Sanctions, Sanctions: $950 Sanctions For Violating Pre-Trial Preparatory Local Rules Affirmed On Appeal

Panel Also Issues Cautionary Warning For Badly Written, Nonpersuasive Appellate Briefs In The Future.

The 1/2 DCA, in Shiheiber v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No A160188 (1st Dist., Div. 2 July 25, 2022) (published), affirmed a $950 sanctions award against an attorney for violating local pre-trial preparatory filing rules under Code of Civil Procedure section 575.2, even noting the trial judge was generous in awarding only this amount which was below State Bar reporting requirements. Attorney, on appeal, advanced arguments rejected by the appellate panel: that section 575.2 was limited only to pre-trial proceedings (no), and there was a necessity to have a bad faith demonstration (no). It also published to indicate that appellant’s appellate briefing was dismissed and totally unpersuasive, warning practitioners that the Division will award appeal sanctions in the future for this type of briefing. (The Division also indicated that respondent did not properly ask for sanctions in a separate noticed motion, only in respondent’s brief, which is in violation of CRC directives, so it would have been disingenuous to award sanctions given this error by the other side.)

Posted at 07:29 PM in Cases: Appeal Sanctions, Cases: Sanctions | Permalink| Comments (0)

Deadlines, Judgment Enforcement: $38,115 In Attorney’s Fees For Prior Appeal And Judgment Enforcement Reversed As A Matter Of Law, Leaving About $26,055 In Fees Intact

Prior Appeal Fees Were Untimely Sought And Judgment Enforcement Request Related To A Judgment Without A Fees Clause Award.

In Peng v. F.M. Tarbell Co., Case No. B317907 (2d Dist., Div. 2 July 25, 2022) (unpublished), a trial judge awarded an additional $64,170 in attorney’s fees relating to appeal expenses and judgment enforcement costs as against appellant. The 2/2 DCA affirmed, but it modified the award to reflect that $38,115 had to be excluded as a matter of law. Specifically, $14,715 related to work on a first appeal, costs which were not timely claimed under the 40-day post-remittitur deadline in light of the costs being requested in connection with the second appeal. The “stricken” other $23,400 amount was infirm because it did not constitute judgment enforcement costs recoverable because the judgment did not contain a fee award at the time the enforcement costs were incurred. (Conservatorship of McQueen, 59 Cal.4th 602, 605, 608-610 (2014) [efforts by a party to oppose an appeal from an underlying judgment are not efforts undertaken to enforce the judgment but to defend it against reversal or modification].)

Posted at 07:23 PM in Cases: Deadlines, Cases: Judgment Enforcement | Permalink| Comments (0)

RESEARCH

Leading Cases

Pages

Contact UsEmailEthics OpinionsLeading CasesRules of Professional ConductStatutes

California Law Reviews

Chapman Law ReviewHastings Law JournalLoyola of Los Angeles Law ReviewSan Diego Law ReviewStanford Law ReviewUC Davis Law ReviewUC Irvine Law ReviewUCLA Law ReviewUniversity of San Francisco Law ReviewUniversity of the Pacific Law Review

Pro Bono Organizations

ACLU
Bet Tzedek
Lambda Legal California
Public Counsel Law Center
Public Law Center Home
Western Justice Center Foundation (WJCF)

California Courthouses

Photographs of California Courthouses Blog powered by Typepad Subscribe to this blog's feed

TAGS:CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY FEES

<<< Thank you for your visit >>>

Websites to related :
Southern California Rotorcraft A

　　Skip to contentSouthern California Rotorcraft AssociationFacebookTwitterInstagramMember LoginHomeAbout Socal RotorsHistoryBoard and AdvisorsMembership

Gray Space Design - Website Desi

　　 Skip to content(626) 525-2926|rob@grayspacedesign.comMy AccountRegisterCart WEB SER

Sierra Electronics Motorola Two-

　　Loading... See Sierra Electronics' response to the Caldor Fire. Learn More Sparks: 775-359-1121 Elko: 775-738-7422 Toggle na

Select Web Ventures - Southern C

　　Need help with a web project?Get your free consultation now.Send us a few details about you and your project and we'll get back to you soon.

San Antonio Texas Personal Injur

　　 × Close Video Free Consultation: 800-862-1260 Tap Here to Call Us San Antonio Texas Personal Injury Lawyer Contact Corpus Chr

Oceanside Carlsbad Vista Califor

Fear of Return | Attorneys for R

　　 EnglishEspañol

Kurz Pfitzer Wolf & Partner - At

　　 Primary Menu Search Call now at: +49 711 410 190 30 Skip to contentLaw officeTeamFields of LawServicesContactNewsDeutschDETeamTeam Christopher A.

Northern California Glaziers, Ar

　　(800) 222-6298glaziersinfo@hsba.comCreate New User AccountParticipants LoginTrustees Login Select LanguageEnglishEspañol#goog-gt-tt {display:none !im

Health Care – Alameda Coun

　　Health Care – Alameda County, CaliforniaA resource for uninsured Alameda County, California residents seeking a free or low-cost doctor, health

ads

Hot Websites

WHY YOU SHOULD Be listed

Matt Cutts, a software engineer and former head of the web spam team at Google, stated back in 2012 that "spammy directories" are disregarded while those who "excercise editorial discretion" worth it. Even though countless business directories litter the internet, they won't all offer a positive change. Don't take unneeded risks and suggest your website to one that Google loves!

Email: liunxqq$$$126.com ($$$=@) ie websites |

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

Web Name: CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

WebSite: http://www.calattorneysfees.com

ID:287012

Keywords:

Description:

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES

ABOUT

SEARCH THIS BLOG

Categories

August 2022

Archives

Copyright

August 18, 2022

Family Law: Section 271 Sanctions Request Must Be Timely Made, But Section 2030 Request Reversed Where It Appeared Ex-Husband Could Bear Fees For Both Sides

Lis Pendens: Challenge To A Lis Pendens Expungement Fee Award Must Be Made Through A Writ Proceeding, In Most Cases

August 17, 2022

SLAPP: SLAPP Fee Award Affirmed Because Hourly Rates Were Reasonable

Private Attorney General: $468,228.73 Fee Award To Sierra Club In CEQA Case Affirmed

Sanctions: $960 Sanctions Order Issued For A Frivolous Motion For Reconsideration Is Affirmed On Appeal

August 16, 2022

Section 1717: $70,882.50 Attorney’s Fees Award Based On A Construction Subcontract Is Affirmed On Appeal

SLAPP: Sixth District Reverses Denial Of Attorney’s Fees And Costs To SLAPPing Defendant Achieving Partial Success

August 15, 2022

Costs: Fifth District, In A 2-1 Split Decision, Confirms That Judicial Council Trial Court Costs Memorandum Form Sufficed For A Verification Despite Not Having “Under Penalty of Perjury” Language

August 13, 2022

Appealability, Special Fee Shifting Statute: Despite No Real Opposition To Civil Harassment Restraining Order Fee Motion, Reversal Of Damages Award Means Fee Award Had To Be Revisited

August 12, 2022

Deadlines, Section 998: Plaintiff’s Acceptance Of A 998 Offer With Stipulated Fee Cap Took The Steam Out Of Later Attorney’s Fees Motion

Fee Clause Interpretation, Mediation: Fee Clause Allowing Only Prevailing Party Attorney’s Fees For Mediation Or Arbitration Proceedings Enforced As Written

August 04, 2022

Arbitration, Retention Agreements: Second Dist. Div. 8 Holds Work Improperly Done By Attorney Not Licensed In California Does Not Completely Invalidate Arbitration Or Retention Agreement

Private Attorney General: Homeowners Prevailing In Malibu District Assessment Validation Battle Properly Denied Over $2.4 Million In Requested Attorney’s Fees

Bankruptcy, Costs, Ethics: Ninth Circuit Reiterates That Costs Associated With Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings Are Nondischargeable In A Chapter 7 Case

July 29, 2022

Section 1717: Interim Award Of Contractual Fees Under Civil Code Section 1717 Are Not Allowable Unless All The Claims In An Action Are Resolved

Deeds Of Trust, Fee Clause Interpretation: Borrower Losing Wrongful Foreclosure Action Was Properly Assessed With Contractual Attorney’s Fees Under the Note To The Tune Of $878,067.11

Section 1717: If You Claim A Redlined Draft Agreement Is The Contract And You Lose, Fee Exposure Can Occur

July 27, 2022

Private Attorney General: Where Plaintiff Did Vindicate Users Of Dangerous Condition Area But Obtained A $1.326 Million Damage Award, Cost/Benefit Analysis Supported Denial Of CCP § 1021.5 Fee Recovery

July 26, 2022

Appeal Sanctions, Sanctions: $950 Sanctions For Violating Pre-Trial Preparatory Local Rules Affirmed On Appeal

Deadlines, Judgment Enforcement: $38,115 In Attorney’s Fees For Prior Appeal And Judgment Enforcement Reversed As A Matter Of Law, Leaving About $26,055 In Fees Intact

RESEARCH

Pages

Blogroll

California Law Reviews

Pro Bono Organizations

California Courthouses

<<< Thank you for your visit >>>

WHY YOU SHOULD Be listed